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The use of a coronavirus contact tracing app has not yet been
demonstrated to be trustworthy, in terms of its purpose, reliability,
e ectiveness or potential harmfulness. Furthermore, the binary nature of its
output must be addressed if trustworthiness is to be achieved.
Data-driven responses to coronavirus are being developed at speed, with smartphone contact tracing
apps proving one of the most controversial. Questions around e cacy and the wider implications of
these apps moved to Parliament on 28 April, at an oral evidence session held by the Commons
Science and Technology Committee.
This session, which included evidence from Matthew Gould, Chief Executive of NHSX – the unit
responsible for setting national policy and developing best practice for the National Health Service
(NHS) technology, including digital and data innovation – was perhaps the  rst public forum to provide
concrete information about the in-development NHS contact tracing app.
While privacy questions were raised, it was the issue of trust that appeared to be the recurring theme
behind much of the parliamentary discussion. Will, and should, the public trust, and therefore use, the
technology? Gould commented that, in order to achieve signi cant levels of download, ‘the message
needs to be, if you want to keep your family and yourselves safe … the app is going to be … an
essential part of the strategy for doing that … it will require us to earn and keep the trust of the
people’.
So this implies that trust is still to be achieved. In my view, the use of a contact tracing app has not yet
been demonstrated to be trustworthy. By this, I mean a whole system including the people within it –
not just the technological element – that can be relied upon to do what it is supposed to do, and to
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show that it has done so, while doing nothing it should not. All elements of this de nition are currently
contested. Only by addressing trustworthiness can NHSX hope to earn the trust that it seeks.
THE PURPOSE OF THE APP
What is the system (of which the contact tracing app is part) supposed to do? This sounds a simple
question but it is not. An NHSX blog gives a basic explanation:
‘Once you install the app, it will start logging the distance between your phone and other phones
nearby that also have the app installed using Bluetooth Low Energy … If you become unwell with
symptoms of COVID-19, you can choose to allow the app to inform the NHS which, subject to
sophisticated risk analysis, will trigger an anonymous alert to those other app users with whom you
came into signi cant contact over the previous few days. The app will advise you what action to take'.
But this only deals with how the app works in a limited sense. Still to be determined is the overall
purpose of the system of which the app is part.
Gould acknowledged that use of an app only makes sense as part of an integrated strategy including
manual contact tracing (especially of those not using the app) and increased testing, all working
towards a consistent aim. This could include the use of data to analyse virus spread, but again, exactly
what information, by whom and for what purposes (statistical or other) has yet to be laid out in detail.
What will individuals receive in return for using the app? This will not necessarily take the form of
individual bene t – rather a contribution to a public health outcome. This outcome – and the
uncertainties as to whether it can be achieved – need to be made clear to the public to facilitate
understanding and debate. This could move the public conversation away from (in my opinion
unhelpful) disputes around ‘centralised’ and ‘decentralised’ contact tracing approaches, to instead
determining exactly what action and data analysis are necessary and proportionate to support a long-
term strategy. Ultimately, strategy is the state’s responsibility, but as the Nu eld Council for Bioethics
argues, to date the government’s strategy appears ‘massively simpli ed’, and lacks detail ‘of what
principles or values are informing the decisions about how to proceed with the “exit”’.
CAN THE SYSTEM BE RELIED UPON?
I would suggest that we do not know. NHSX says that ‘millions of us are going to need to trust the app
and follow the advice it provides.’ As yet, there are few convincing reasons why we should. Discussing
models on which the NHSX app will apparently be based, Professor Christophe Fraser from the Big
Data Institute in Oxford proposed that the app will operate with self-diagnosis, conceding that this
would mean ‘more people receiving noti cations as a result of false warnings' but that the 'e ect of
suppressing the epidemic more quickly outweighs the risks in waiting for a test before the
noti cation'. However, the 'over-70s have not been factored in' – they have to 'remain at home'. How
will these limitations and inaccuracies be mitigated by the overall virus-suppression strategy? An
approach that is dependent on everyone over 70 staying at home for an inde nite time would not –
from their perspective of the over 70s – ‘work’ for them.
As explained during the Committee evidence session, the app will turn potentially inaccurate
Bluetooth contact measurements into a ‘binary decision’ as to whether to advise an individual to self-
isolate. Noti cation will happen when measurements hit a certain threshold. What this threshold
should be – bearing in mind that the app will lack ‘knowledge’ of individual context – is an opinion-
based judgement. How will it be made?
Furthermore, a binary decision hides the uncertain nature of the app’s output, and varying levels of
infection risk that the measurements may suggest, depending on individual circumstances. The app
will have no idea, for instance, whether a person was wearing a mask. My work with Alexander Babuta
on algorithms and data analytics in policing has recommended that:
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‘Statistical forecasting systems based on algorithms should not be described as … “risk assessment”
tools, but more accurately as “classi cation and prioritisation systems”, with the human user
maintaining ultimate responsibility for the overall risk assessment’.
NHSX expects the public to trust the app, but a binary output appears unlikely to provide enough
explanation for this to happen. The human user should be given the information that they need to
make risk judgements themselves, including the uncertainties involved in the app’s output and the
options available to them.
DEMONSTRATING EFFECTIVENESS
The system must be shown to do what it is supposed to do in order for people to trust it. There will be
a data protection impact statement, according to the evidence session, but details of the proposed
model will not be published before local testing is completed. There will be an ethics advisory board
for the app, but its full membership, terms of reference and commitment to transparency are yet to
be con rmed.
There are missed opportunities here:  rst, to have incorporated the legal, ethical and societal input
from the start (the app was said to have been in development since March). As Chair of the West
Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner and West Midlands Police data ethics committee, I know
that an approach which incorporates input from people with a variety of perspectives at early stages
of a project is more e ective and therefore more trustworthy. Second, to invite challenge from diverse
perspectives, other disciplines, the ‘rebels’, to ensure that the direction is not set by those who
vehemently agree. Third, to expand the discussion away from one-dimensional de nitions of privacy
and individual data protection preferences, to the wider question of how the state will defend
individuals from potential detriments that they may not even be aware of.
MINIMISING HARM
How to ensure that the system does nothing it should not? Although important, the answer to this
does not just revolve around data security and anonymisation. This element of trustworthiness
requires us to predict the bad things that might happen – something lawyers are trained to do! If we
can anticipate unintended uses – such as the app being demanded for employment, property
occupation or access to services – we must put in place ways of stopping these things happening, by a
combination of law (a team of UK academics have suggested safeguards; Australia has a
Determination pending formal legislation), regulation, oversight, enforcement and technical design.
As the Chair of the Commons Committee, Greg Clark, concluded last week, ‘fundamental questions’
remain; answering these will require a willingness to listen and respond to diverse perspectives.
Achieving trustworthiness requires a series of system-wide graduated steps, not a binary process.
The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other
institution.
BANNER IMAGE: A visualisation of a coronavirus infection. Courtesy of Adobe Stock
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